Superfast and maneuverable, stealthy, and providing its pilot with instantly comprehendible information about everything going on around him, the F-22 🍉 incorporates so many fighter “firsts” that it will be the benchmark of air combat power for at least a quarter-century.
Almost 🍉 every year since the program’s inception, however, the F-22 has been hounded by budget-cutters in Congress and the Pentagon who 🍉 question the Air Force’s need for such a powerful fighter. Especially now, with defense budgets at near-historic postwar lows, critics 🍉 hold the Raptor up as a prime example of an expensive program that doesn’t know the Cold War is over, 🍉 a case of technological overkill for the fighter threats that may pop up in the coming decade.
The F-22 program has 🍉 been cut, delayed, or restructured so many times in the last seven years that most observers have lost count. Originally 🍉 pegged at a buy of 750 airplanes, the planned inventory slipped to 650, then 600, then 442, and now, with 🍉 the Quadrennial Defense Review, 339–slightly more than three wing’s worth. As the buy has descended, unit cost has climbed, and 🍉 some members of Congress worry that the F-22 may price itself out of existence. As Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio) recently 🍉 remarked in a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, “We must be vigilant that the program not go the way of 🍉 previous programs” such as the B-2, “where the sticker shock overwhelms the capability improvements.”
To underline the point, Congress has imposed 🍉 aR$40.9 billion program cost cap on the F-22, much as was done with the B-1B and B-2 programs. If the 🍉 project exceeds the cap, the Air Force must fund the overage from other accounts.
With the reduced buy, the Pentagon also 🍉 cut the peak production rate of the F-22 from 48 per year to 36 a year, reduced the engine buy 🍉 from 1,027 to 777, and cut the initial production batch from 70 to 58 aircraft.
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